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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY !' 
DISTRICT .. 
' Platntrff and Respondent, 
, Case No. 
vs. I 9317 
LOIS A. HISLOP, et al., \' 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This suit was filed by the Weber Basin Water Conservancy 
District, hereinafter referred to as the ((District," to condemn 
certain lands and easements for the enlargetnent of the Pine-
view Reservoir. Included was a small tract of land belonging 
to the appellant which was farm or pasture land entirely 
unrelated to the property in the Town of Huntsville upon 
which "Jack's Shack'' is located. This appeal does not involve 
the land which the District brought suit to condemn. 
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The appellant has by her counterclaim attempted to 
engraft upon the condemnation suit an action for damages 
allegedly caused by the relocation of a highway pursuant to a 
contract between the United States of America and the State 
Road Commission of Utah, dated June 30, 1955, which pro-
vides for the relocation of the part of the old highway) No. 
39, from Ogden to Huntsville which would be affected by the 
enlargement of the Pineview Reservoir. The contract, marked 
Exhibit I, was received in evidence in this case. Paragraphs 
5 and 6 provide: 
( ( 5. The Highway Department will relocate and re-
construct that portion of State Highways, Number 39, 
between Points A and B into the town of Huntsville, 
Utah, and Number 162, between Points G and F, into 
the town of Eden, Utah, respectively, together with a 
spur to connect with the Liberty highway from Number 
162 beginning at Point H and running in a northerly 
direction for approximately 0.65 of a mile, all as 
shown in blue on the location map attached hereto 
and made a part hereof, marked Exhibit 1, or at such 
other locations as may be mutually agreed upon by the 
parties hereto. The total of the relocated State high-
ways amounts to approximately 5.0 miles. The said 
Highway Department will also reconstruct and relocate 
pursuant to the authority granted the Highway De-
partment by the County, that portion of the County's 
road system between the towns of Huntsville and Eden 
between Points B and C and between Points D and E 
shown in Green on said Exhibit 1 or at such other 
points as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties 
hereto, and comprising a total of approximately 1.7 
miles. All relocated roads to be constructed by the 
Highway Department will include approaches and 
access roads for use by adjacent landowners and all 
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other appurtenances in connection with the relocations. 
The relocated portions of said highways and roads 
are hereinafter referred to as relocated highways. The 
Highway Department will acquire all rights-of-way 
for the relocated highways except those to be acquired 
by the United States as provided in Article 8 hereof. 
Contracts for such relocation and reconstruction work 
shall be awarded by the Highway Department to best 
bidders based on public invitation for bids. The High-
way Department agrees that the relocated highways, 
including all bituminous surfacing, will be completed 
by April 1, 1957. The relocated highways will be con-
structed to a standard equal to the highways and roads 
before relocation, typical sections of which are shown 
on Exhibits 2 and 3 attached hereto and made a part 
hereof, and will be constructed in accordance with 
plans and specifications to be prepared by the Highway 
Department and approved by the United States. Should 
the Highway Department desire to construct the re-
located highways or any of them to a standard superior 
to that described above, the additional cost of such 
superior construction shall be borne by the Highway 
Department. The Highway Department will, at its 
sole cost and expense, operate and maintain the re-
located State highways and the County will at its sole 
cost and expense, operate and maintain the relocated 
County roads. 
"6. The United States will pay to the Highway De-
partment for the faithful performance of this contract, 
not to exceed the sum of Six Hundred and Fifty Thou-
sand and no/100 Dollars ($650,000.00) in appropriate 
installments as the work on the relocated highways 
progresses, based on monthly certified cost statements 
showing contractors earnings and administrative and 
general expenses directly related to the work." (Em-
phasis added) . 
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It will be noted that in paragraph 5 the Highway Depart-
ment (State Road Commission of Utah) agrees to "acquire all 
rights-of-way for the relocated highways" (except between 
certain stations not involved here). The United States agreed 
to pay to the Highway Department, nfor the faithful perform-
ance of this contract not to exceed the sum of Six Hundred 
and Fifty Thousand and no/100 Dollars ( $650,000.00) in 
appropriate installments ... " See paragraph 6. 
The District is not a party to the contract, and there is 
no evidence or stipulation that the District had anything what-
ever to do with the selection of the route of the new road or 
with its construction. 
It is apparent from the pleadings, the stipulation of facts 
and the map attached to the stipulation that the relocation 
of the main road to Huntsville did not affect the appellant's 
access to the existing streets in Huntsville. They have not been 
changed. Ingress and egress, approach, and grade are not 
changed. There has been no physical change in the roads upon 
which appellant's property fronts. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The District is not liable for damages caused by the 
road relocation. 
2. The diverting of traffic is not compensable. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT IS NOT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES 
CAUSED BY THE ROAD RELOCATION. 
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The appellant is seeking to recover damages from the 
District which allegedly result, not from any action or taking 
by the District, but from the relocation of a road by the State 
Road Commission pursuant to a written contract, Exhibit I, 
between the United States and the State Road Commission. 
The District is not a party to the contract under which the 
road was relocated, did not choose the route, and had nothing 
whatever to do with the construction. Furthermore, the contract 
expressly provides that the State Road Commission shall acquire 
rights-of-way and that the United States shall pay not to exceed 
$650,000.00 for the rights-of-way and road construction. 
There is no casual connection insofar as the District is 
concerned between the condemnation by the District of land 
\\"hich would be inundated by the reservoir, and the relocation 
of a highway by the State Road Commission under a contract 
with the United States. These activities are separate and 
distinct. The District was obligated to acquire and pay for 
lands in the enlarged reservoir site, and the present condem-
nation case was filed to carry out that responsibility. The 
United States and the State Road Commission were obligated 
to accomplish the road relocation. Damages flowing from the 
taking of the reservoir site lands must be paid for by the 
District and damages resulting from the road relocation must 
be paid by the State Road Commission out of the $650,000.00 
provided for that purpose. 
The appellant's theory ts that because the Pineview 
Reservoir is being enlarged, the roads must be relocated and 
if the roads are relocated and damage results, this damage 
should be paid by the District because the Weber Basin Project 
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is being built for the District. If this line of reasoning were 
followed to its logical conclusions suit would lie against any 
beneficiary or group of beneficiaries of a public project By 
the same sort of logic it could be well contended that the 
Weber Basin Project is largely for the benefit of the City of 
Ogden, therefore the City of Ogden should be liable for 
damage caused by the relocation of the road. The District 
had no more to do with the road relocation than the City. 
No cases have been cited by the appellant in support of her 
position on this point and indeed none could be. 
The only case we have been able to find in which a land-
owner sought to recover damages from a party other than 
the one actually relocating the highway is Cranley v. Boyd 
County and the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad Co., 266 Ky. 
569, 99 SW 2d 737. In that case the location of a highway was 
changed to avoid a railway grade crossing, and a landowner 
who conducted a business which had formerly been conveniently 
located for patronage but which could not thereafter be 
reached except by a circuitous route, sued both the County 
and the Railway Company. A directed verdict for the Railway 
Company was sustained as it did not construct the road. The 
road was constructed by the County. 
In the instant case the road was relocated by the Road 
Commission and not by the District and therefore no action 
will lie against the District. It is submitted that the order 
denying the appellant's motion for a summary judgment should 
be sustained on this ground alone. 
THE DIVERTING OF TRAFFIC IS NOT COM-
PENSABLE. 
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Both of the appellant's points stated on page 6 of her 
brief are based upon the assumption that a landowner has a 
property right in the flow of traffic on a highway adjacent 
to his place of business. It is argued that if the volume of 
traffic is diminished by reason of re-routing noccasioned solely 
by reason of the enlargement of a reservoir which submerges 
an existing highway," such loss of traffic flow is compensable 
because the re-routing is not a traffic regulation under the 
police power. In other words, the contention is that damages 
caused by road route changes made for reasons of safety and 
convenience are not compensable, but damages flowing from 
changes made for other reasons are compensable. 
The attempted distinction although interesting from an 
academic standpoint has no application in this case. The 
vital weakness in the appellant's argument is that the facts 
show no damage to any property or property right. 
Let us examine the nature and extent of the property 
rights incident to the ownership of land abutting on a public 
street. Whether a landowner owns the fee title to the street 
subject to the right of the public to travel it, or whether the 
title has passed to the state, county or city he has a right of 
access, light and air. The following excerpt from the opinion 
in the early case of Dooley Block v. Salt Lake Rapid Transit 
Co., 9 Utah 31, 33 P. 229, quoted in the case of State v. District 
Court, 94 Utah 384, 78 P 2d 502, clearly defines such rights: 
C( • • • When land is settled upon and occupied as a 
town site, and lots are sold, the right of way over the 
streets in front of such lots is an appurtenance of neces-
sity, and it requires no special grant in the deed. [Citing 
cases. J The rights of access, light, and air constitute 
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the principal values of such property, and it must be 
presurr1ed that when lots are sold the grantees purchase 
them with a view to the advantages and benefits which 
attach to them because of these easements. The right 
of the grantee to their use is precisely the same as 
his right to the property itself. Such privileges are 
easements in fee,-incorporeal hereditaments,- and 
form a part of the estate in the lots. They attach at the 
time the land is platted and the lots are sold, and will 
remain a perpeh1al incumbrance upon the land bur-
dened with them. * * * Equally in both cases the 
abutting owners are entitled to the use of the street 
as a means of access to their lots, and for light and 
air. If the fee is in the city, the rights of the abutter are 
in the nature of equitable easements in fee; if in the 
abutter, they are in their nature legal. In either case 
the abutters have the right to have the street kept open 
and not obstructed so as to interfere with their ease-
ments, and materially diminish the value of their prop-
erty ... " 
But the owner of land abutting on a highway has no 
property or other vested right in the flow of traffic on a street. 
In the case of State v. Hoblitt, 87 Mont. 403, 288 P. 181, the 
court said: 
''The owner of land abutting on a highway estab-
lished by the public has no property or other vested 
right in the continuance of it as a highway at public 
expense, and, at least in the absence of deprivation 
of ingress and egress, cannot claim damages for its 
mere discontinuance, although such discontinuance 
diverts traffic from his door and diminishes his trade 
and thus depreciates the value of his land. [Citing 
cases.]" To the same effect are State ex-rel. Johnson 
v. Board of Com'rs of Deer Lodge County, 19 Mont. 
582, 49 P. 147, and State v. Bradsha\v Land & Live-
stock Co., 99 Mont. 95, 43 P.2d 674. 
10 
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.. The same principle was stated in State Highway 
Commission v. Humphreys, 58 S.W. 2d 144, 145, by 
the Texas Court of Civ. App. ( 1933) quoting from the 
Kansas case of Heller v. Atchinson, T. & S. F. Ry Co., 
28 Kan. 625, as follows: .. 'The benefits which come 
and go from the changing currents of travel are not 
matters in respect to which any individual has any 
vested right against the judgment of the public authori-
ties.' If the public authorities could never change a 
street or highway without paying all persons along 
such thoroughfares for their loss of business, the cost 
would be prohibitive. The highways primarily are for 
the benefit of the traveling public, and are only inci-
dentally for the benefit of those who are engaged in 
business along its way. They build up their businesses 
knowing that new roads may be built that will large! y 
take away the traveling public. This is a risk they 
must necessarily assume." 
It logically follows, and it has been almost uniformly held 
that a highway relocation which changes the traffic volume 
passing a given business does not result in compensable injury. 
Robinett v. Price, 74 Utah 512, 280 P. 736 
Krebs v. State Road Com., 160 Md. 584, 154 A. 131 
State v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 97, 126 N.E. 2d 53 
Hempstead County v. Huddleston, 182 Ark. 276, 31 
S.W. 2d 300 
Richmond v. Hinton, 117 W.Va. 223, 185 S.E. 411 
Kachele v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 109 Conn. 151, 
145 A. 756 
See Note: 118 A.L.R. 921 
In the case of Kachele v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., supra, 
the court said: 
11 
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c cThe action of the defendant of which the plaintiff 
complains has not resulted in the closing, obstruction 
or impairing-of this highway adjacent to his premises. 
Neither the grade, character nor serviceability of the 
street at this point has been affected. Access to, and 
egress from his land can be had as freely as ever. The 
sole ground upon which he rests his claim for recovery 
is that highway access has been rendered more incon-
venient than it was, and a more circuitous route must 
be taken in approaching or leaving the property in one 
direction-Where highway changes-occasion a land-
owner no other damage than to render access to his land 
more inconvenient than it formerly was, by reason of 
a circuitous route being required to be taken, he has 
no right of action.'' 
In the case of Hempstead County v. Huddleston, supra, 
the court stated the rule as follows: 
UNo person has a vested right in the maintenance of 
a public highway in any particular place, as the power 
is in the state to relocate the road at any time in the 
public interest. Therefore the change in the road did 
not constitute an element of damage in this case." 
If, as the cases cited hold, the appellant had no property 
right in the flow of traffic there was no compensable injury 
in this case. The old road still passes in front of the appellant's 
property. The grade is not changed. The right of access is not 
impaired. There can be no question but that the only change 
is in the flow of traffic. 
If no property right \vas impaired by the high,vay change 
it is of no concern to the appellant \vhether the highway d1ange 
\vas made to shorten the road, to avoid a dangerous curve or 
to skirt a new reservoir. The State or other condemnor had 
12 
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the same right of condemnation to relocate the road to make 
possible the enlargement of the reservoir as it would have 
to relocate the road to avoid a dangerous curve. The public 
interest requires the change in both instances. 
The fact that the words tcor damaged" appear tn the 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Sec. 22, does not strengthen the 
appellant's argument. 
If no property right was taken or impaired the consti-
tutional and statutory provisions have no application. Certainly 
if there is no property right in the flow of traffic there has 
been no impairment or taking of a property right. 
The cases cited by the appellant on pages 14 and 15 of 
her brief are not in point because in each case there was a 
physical change which impaired the means of ingress and 
egress. In the case of Denver Union Terminal Ry. Co. v. Glodt, 
67 Colo. 115, 186 P. 904, the court pointed out that as a result 
of closing certain streets the landowner was left only ( (an 
inadequate and dangerous way for egress on a street occupied 
by a viaduct.'· In the present case the street on which the 
appellant's property fronted was undisturbed for several blocks 
in each direction. 
There is a line of cases holding that, if as the result of the 
relocation of a road, property abutting thereon is placed in 
a cul de sac there is impairment of ingress and egress causing 
compensable injury. Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 
343, 128 P. 2d 181, 144 P. 2d 818. The cases hold, however, 
that this principle is inapplicable where the obstruction in 
the road or road change was beyond a street intersection. It is 
13 
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apparent from an inspection of the map on page 20 of the 
appellant's brief that the cul de sac rule is not applicable here 
because there are two street intersections between the appel-
lant's place of business and the point where the old road to 
Ogden is blocked by the reservoir enlargement. 
The effect of applying the rule contended for by the 
appellant is pointed out in the case of Richmond v. Hinton, 
117 W.Va. 223, 185 S.E. 411: 
n ( • • • The just compensation guaranteed by the 
Constitution must be confined within bounds. There 
must be a reasonable limit beyond which the guaranty 
is not applicable. Conceding that there is difficulty in 
determining just where the bounds should be laid 
down, it is evident that the difficulty is accentuated 
if remote and indirect damages are to be allowed. 
Where would the line be drawn? Conceivably a mer-
cantile business would have fewer patrons, and an 
apartment house be rendered less desirable, and a 
dwelling less eligible because of the closing of a street 
two or three blocks away. A residence may be rendered 
less conveniently situated with respect to the metro-
politan district of the city because a street is closed at 
a railroad crossing some distance away. Residential 
property rna y be rendered less desirable to some occu-
pants thereof by there being located in the vicinity 
a school, a playground, or a municipal hospital. If 
damages could be recovered in such circumstances, 
crushing burdens \vould be imposed on the public 
treasury.'' 
14 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear that the appellant cannot prevail because the 
road was not relocated by the respondent, and because the 
diversion of traffic from property is not a compensable injury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD 
E.]. SKEEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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